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It is generally accepted that the rich are more likely to participate in politics than the poor. It is also
generally accepted that the probability than an individual will participate in elections is inﬂuenced by the
gap between the rich and the poor. There is little agreement, however, about whether inequality across
time and space increases or decreases participation. In this paper we examine the impact of inequality
across space. We suggest that the impact of inequality depends crucially onwhether it is deﬁned in terms
of variations between geographical units (‘segregation’) or within geographical units (‘heterogeneity’).
Evidence to support this argument is drawn from multi-level British data. Heterogeneity has a mildly
positive effect on participation but this effect seems to be outweighed by the negative impact of
segregation. The effect of segregation, moreover, is most pronounced among the poorer sections of the
population, indicating that geographical isolation among the poor ('ghettoization') leads to lower turnout
among these groups.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Political equality is central to contemporary understandings of
democracy (Dahl, 2006).1 Citizens should not only have equal right
to participate in collective decision-making, they should exercise
those rights by participating in the selection of their representa-
tives. Active participation in the political process is desirable
because it produces better citizens (Mill, 1861). Participation is also
desirable because it produces more representative decisions
(Bartels, 2008; Enns and Wlezien, 2011). Indeed, without partici-
pation, the claim that democracy is essentially an exercise in self-
government rings hollow.
Freedom is also central to democracy. This is usually held to
include freedom to keep what one earns, freedom to inherit and
freedom to simply enjoy one's luck (Welch,1999; Nozick, 2001). It is
sometimes argued that inequality provides incentives for work,
self-reliance and thrift. It is also argued that inequality must bend Social Research Council
or particularly thoughtful and
en Anderson for generously
d through spatial simulation.
rah.birch@kcl.ac.uk (S. Birch),
r Ltd. This is an open access articletolerated because it reduces poverty as prosperity ‘trickles down’ to
the poorest (c.f Chang, 2003). And it is ﬁnally suggested that
inequality must be accepted because programmes to correct it
would give the state too much power (Hayek, 2001). Whatever
argument is deployed, some degree of inequality is often supposed
to be the price of a free society.
In recent years there has been a general fall in the level of po-
litical participation across a number of established western de-
mocracies. In many of these countries this reduction in
participation has roughly coincided with an increase in economic
equality. Both the decline in participation and rise in inequality
have individually caused concern among policy-makers (Putnam,
2000; Dalton, 2008; Whiteley, 2012; Dorling, 2015; Wilkinson
and Pickett, 2009; Gilens, 2005, 2012; Jacobs and Skocpol, 2005;
Stiglitz, 2012; Verba et al., 2004). The coincidence of these phe-
nomena, however, has led some to speculate that there may be a
causal relationship between the two.1
Decades of electoral behaviour research in numerous estab-
lished democracies have demonstrated that there is a general
tendency for people on higher incomes to vote more regularly than1 It might be noted that the Pearson's R correlation between turnout at UK
general elections and the income based measure of the Gini coefﬁcient produced by
the Institute for Fiscal Studies between 1964 and 2010 is 0.78 (N ¼ 13).
under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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1995; Leighley and Nagler, 2013). The relationship between
inequality and participation, however, is far from clear. This is, in
part, because inequality is a relational concept. If inequality were to
increase over time because more people were getting rich, for
example, we might expect to see a rise in turnout levels, whereas if
inequality were increasing because more people were getting poor,
turnout would be expected to fall. If both phenomena occurred at
once e the rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer e then
these changes would offset each other. The relationship between
inequality and turnout depends crucially on precisely how
inequality is measured. Similarly, we argue that the impact of
inequality between areas (‘segregation’) differs from inequality
within areas (‘heterogeneity’). If we are to appreciate its role in
shaping behaviour, ‘inequality’ needs clarifying to reﬂect the subtle
patterns of socio-economic differentiation (Atkinson, 1970; Jenkins
and Van Kerm, 2009).
The paper examines the impact of spatial inequality.2 Section 1
lays our theoretical expectations about the relationship between
spatial inequality and turnout. Section 2 discusses our data and
section 3 outlines the statistical models that are used to estimate
the effects of inequality on the probability that an individual will
vote. Section 4 outlines our ﬁndings. Section 5 brieﬂy discusses the
broader implications of our ﬁndings.2. Theoretical expectations
The vast majority of research on political participation focuses
on identifying those social and psychological characteristics that
distinguish voters from non-voters (Wolﬁnger and Rosenstone,
1980; Leighley and Nagler, 2013). Among the many variables that
identify non-voters, few have received as much attention as socio-
economic status (Crewe, 1981). The ‘civic voluntarism’ model, for
example, suggests that richer individuals are more likely to vote
because they have both the motivation and ability to participate in
politics (Verba et al., 1995). For purely compositional reasons,
therefore, political engagement and participation are expected to
be higher in more afﬂuent areas.
The ‘who votes?’ approach makes a great deal of sense; indeed,
any analyses that omitted reference to the personal characteristics
of the individual would be found wanting. Yet human beings are
social animals (Goodin and Tilly, 2008). They are naturally inﬂu-
enced by their social context, even if they are not conscious of it
(Wilson, 2002). To be sure, many people are suspicious of aggre-
gates and believe them to be abstractions. Yet the individual is,
according to at least one way of thinking, every bit as much an
abstraction as any group. Over time, we are inﬂuenced by move-
ments of the collective herd (Stimson, 1999, p.2). And across space
we are all inﬂuenced by ‘others’ who inhabit the same places
(MacKuen, 2002, p. 306). Accordingly, spatial context should have
an impact on individual participation over and above any compo-
sitional effect (Huckfeld and Sprague, 1995).
It is increasingly recognized that individuals are inﬂuenced by
their social context. There is little agreement, however, about the
relationship between inequality participation. Some maintain that
inequality should exert a demobilizing effect (Goodin and Dryzek,
1980; Horn, 2011; Jaime-Castillo, 2009; Solt, 2008). Others main-
tain that it should exert a mobilizing effect (Oliver, 1999, 2001). We2 It is worth emphasising that inequality inﬂuences participation across both
space and time. In an ideal research design we would have data on the evolution of
turnout and spatial inequality over time. Unfortunately, there is simply not enough
data on the spatial distribution of income that would enable us to undertake such a
study.argue that the impact of inequality depends on who is being
compared. The number of possible comparisons is virtually limit-
less. Nevertheless, some are more ‘obvious’ and inﬂuential than
others. As Lippmann noted:
For the most part we do not ﬁrst see, and then deﬁne, we deﬁne
ﬁrst and thenwe see. In the great blooming buzzing confusion of
the out world we pick out what our culture has already deﬁned
for us (Lippman, 1997, pp.54-5).
Political activity occurs in contexts e ‘areas’, ‘places’ or ‘neigh-
bourhoods’ (Huckfeld and Sprague, 1995). Our notion of place or
context is typically a shared one based on administrative or
geographical units: wards, towns or counties (Therborn, 2008).
These institutions provide a structure for attitudes, perceptions and
provide frames for comparison (Sniderman, 2000, p. 75). They also
inﬂuence notions of ‘representation’.
In this paper we argue that it is important to distinguish be-
tween differences in afﬂuence between and differences in afﬂuence
within places. Sharp differences between places can produce
‘distinct and homogeneous clusters of unequal social privilege and
political inﬂuence, intensifying the social and political isolation and
polarization of neighbourhoods’ (Soss and Jacobs, 2009, p. 100).
Such ‘segregation’ reduces the probability the rich and poor
interact in a shared spaces and shared institutions such as shops
and churches or civic amenities such as leisure centres, parks and so
on. This reduces participation for three reasons. First, social-
psychological studies suggest that exposure to ‘out’ groups can
make ‘in’ group membership more accessible and heighten the
individual's ‘in’ group identity (Smith and McKie, 2000). Accord-
ingly, the less contact there is between rich and poor, the weaker
the sense of ‘in group’ identity and the weaker the ‘out group’
threat.3 These effects will dampen perceptions of competition and
conﬂict for both groups and exert a demobilizing effect. Second,
segregation inﬂuences access to social capital: ‘living in deeply
disadvantaged neighbourhoods both imposes harsh conditions and
removes critical communities and networks in schools, religious
organizations, and other bodies that might bolster skills and op-
portunity for enterprising individuals’ (Soss and Jacobs, 2009, p.
122; Quillian, 2014, p. 464). By contrast, those who live in more
afﬂuent areas are able to draw on social networks and acquire in-
formation more readily (Cook, 2014).4 Third, the representatives of
more afﬂuent areas may be thought to be better at achieving their
political goals than those in poorer areas. Even if it is incorrect, this
belief may enhance voters' perceptions of political efﬁcacy in
afﬂuent areas and reduce it in poorer areas (Goodin and Dryzek,
1980). Those living in afﬂuent areas expect their voices to be
heard and responded to. Those living in poorer areas, on the other
hand, may conclude that there is little point in participating, as
their views are unlikely to be taken into account by decision-
makers (Quillian, 2014, p. 471).
For these reasons, our ﬁrst hypothesis is:
H1. Ceteris paribus socio-economic segregation between
geographical units (‘segregation’) reduces the probability than an
individual will vote.
Our expectations about the effect of inequality within shared3 Self-selection poses a threat to inference. The more afﬂuent who choose to live
in socially mixed areas may exhibit different behaviour from otherwise matched
individuals.
4 It has also been suggested residence in poor neighbourhoods contributes to
poverty and joblessness as a result of a lack of role models, a lack of contact with
employed people and limited parental monitoring. See Wilson (1996).
6 Speciﬁcally, we used the third edition of the survey (February 2012). This is an
interim release that provided early access to data from Understanding Society for
the general population sample component. The release of the full Wave 2 data was
in late 2012. Full details of the survey can be obtained from the project website:
https://www.understandingsociety.ac.uk/.
7 Understanding Society is a longitudinal study, but we used it as a cross-
sectional dataset.
8 We used the English Government Ofﬁces for the Regions (GORs), with the six
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Inequality within places increases the probability that rich and poor
interact in a shared space. This is likely to heighten both the sense
of ‘in’ group identity and ‘out’ group threat. It may also stimulate a
sense of personal grievance, resentment or fear that provides a
further spur to participation (Fiske, 2002; Brady, 2004, p.697). The
stronger the individual's group identity, moreover, the more likely
they are to experience emotions on behalf of their groups, since the
group becomes part of the ‘self’ (Smith and McKie, 2000, p. 196).
These emotions are likely to further stimulate participation. Sec-
ond, interaction between people in different socio-economic posi-
tions may lead to a ‘sharing’ of social capital that can be deployed to
achieve common goals. Those who are relatively poor in social
capital may, therefore, be able to draw on the resources of those
who are relatively rich, increasing the probability that they will
vote (Putnam, 2000). Third, elite-led mobilization is easier in more
homogeneous settings. It has long been recognized that local
campaign activity inﬂuences turnout (Denver and Hands, 1997;
Goldstein and Ridout, 2002; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). To be
sure, parties tend to focus their campaign activities in marginal
constituencies. Nevertheless, they ﬁnd it easier to mobilize people
in those areas that contain a high proportion of their supporters
and active members. (Schier, 2000).5
Accordingly, our second hypothesis is:
H2. Ceteris paribus socio-economic heterogeneity within
geographical units (‘heterogeneity’) increases the probability than
an individual will vote.
Most existing analyses pay little attention to the geographic unit
at which the causal processes operate. Yet geographical scale
clearly structures the relationship between inequality and partici-
pation. Inequality is e after all e a relational concept. In order to
specify its effects, therefore, it is necessary to identify the set of
individuals it relates and the relevant social space in which they
interact (Tunstall et al., 2000). Elections are also a relational affair:
individuals vote for a common representative within a geographi-
cally deﬁned area. It is also necessary to establish the most
appropriate level of geographic aggregation.
Identifying the most appropriate level raises the statistical issue
of bias (Openshaw, 1984; Lobao and Hooks, 2007; Irwin, 2007). It
also raises a socio-political issue since there is likely to be some
variation in the way that people interact within geographical units
and their perception of their context will depend on how they
experience inequality. The analyses above suggest that inequality
and segregation at the level of the neighbourhood or locality are
likely to have a greater impact than the same variables at the more
remote regional- (or national-) level. Local-level inequality is a
more immediate phenomenon e it is part of the lived experiences
of individuals in the domains of employment, consumption and
civic activity. Accordingly, our third hypothesis is that:
H3. Segregation and heterogeneity will have greater effects on
individual voting behaviour at lower levels of aggregation.
There also appear to be good reasons to expect that the impact
of inequality will depend on the personal characteristics of the
individual. In particular, it seems plausible to suggest that the poor
e with less education, wealth and income e will not have the
personal resources to offset the effects of segregation or hetero-
geneity on group identities, social capital and political efﬁcacy.
Accordingly, we also hypothesize that:5 To be sure, parties tend to focus their campaign activities in marginal constit-
uencies but the point remains that mobilization is far easier in socially homoge-
neous contexts.H4. Segregation and heterogeneity will have greater effects on
those on lower incomes.
We test these four hypotheses using appropriate data in section
4 below. Before we do so, however, we introduce our data and
methods.
3. Data
We draw on data from Great Britain, a political system that has
frequently been used to illustrate contextual effects on political
preferences, evaluations and party choice (Jones et al., 1992;
Tunstall et al., 2000). The data for this study are drawn from
waves 1e2 of the Understanding Society survey conducted by the
Institute for Social and Economic Research (ISER) at the University
of Essex.6 The survey provides invaluable evidence about the ex-
periences, behaviours and attitudes of approximately 54,597 adults
residing in the United Kingdom. The sample used in our paper is
smaller because we used an interim release of the second wave.
Moreover, we only considered data collected after general election
day on 6 May 2010. Even after imposing this condition, the sample
contains approximately 10000 observationsemore than enough to
test our hypotheses.7
The dependent variable used in the current study comes from
the responses to the voting question ‘Did you vote in this (past)
year's general election?’ We exclude those respondents who were
not eligible to vote at the 2010 general election and use self-
reported vote. Given the well-documented tendency to over-
report vote we would ideally have preferred to have data on vali-
dated votes. No vote validation was carried out for this study.
Previous studies have noted over-reporting responses due to social
desirability and false memories. Research, however, suggests that
the exaggeration is not substantial (Swaddle and Heath, 1989).
Moreover, individual-level models using reported and validated
vote produce very similar estimates (Clarke et al., 2004).
Since our primary interest is to assess the impact of inequality at
different geographical scales, wematched survey respondents with
macro-level data for three types of geographical unit: the parlia-
mentary constituency, local authority and region.8 We estimated
the impact of economic segregation and heterogeneity for each of
those units.
There are signiﬁcant challenges associated with creating these
measures since there is little data on incomes within small areas.
The UK population census e the major source of social data e does
not collect data on either household or individual incomes. This
limitation required us to develop alternative strategies to obtain
information on income dispersion within small geographical units.
In the event, we relied on income estimates obtained through a
process of spatial micro-simulation.9 These estimates were created
using 2001 Census data together with the Family Resources SurveyMetropolitan counties (Greater Manchester, Merseyside, South Yorkshire, Tyne and
Wear, West Midlands and West Yorkshire) separated out and Inner and Outer
London. This sub-division was proposed by Johnston and colleagues. See Johnston
et al. (1998).
9 The small-area estimates were generated through spatial simulation by Ben
Anderson.
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ically, we used the estimated number of households in each £5k
gross income bracket for all Lower Super Output Areas (LSOAs) in
England.11
With these data to hand, we use as our measure of heteroge-
neity the commonly-employed Index of Qualitative Variation (IQV)
in household income. Since LSOAs are one of the lowest adminis-
trative or geographical units, we could calculate the IQV of different








where k is the number of categories of the income variable (seven
categories in our case) and pi is their relative frequency. The IQV
expresses the degree to which the cases are dispersed over
different categories of the variable. The scores range from 1
(maximum dispersion, that is, in the cases where the relative fre-
quencies are equal for all categories of the variable), to 0 (no
dispersion, that is, when one hundred per cent of the cases are
concentrated in a single variable value). IQV represents one of
several ways inwhich heterogeneity can be measured and provides
a good estimate of geographic dispersion.
We also examine the impact of economic segregation, under-
stood as the spatial distribution of wealth or deprivation within
areas. For this purpose, we employed the Isolation Index of Segre-
gation (IIS). The data for building this measure were gathered by
the Department for Work and Pensions and correspond to the total
working age population who were receiving any state beneﬁt at
May 2010.12 We calculated three indices at different geographical
scales: the index of isolation within constituencies (wards over
constituencies), the index of isolation within local authorities
(wards over local authorities) and the index of isolation within










where xil is the populationwho received any beneﬁt in the area i (in
our case, wards or local authorities) in the large geographic entity l
(in our case, local authorities, constituencies or regions); t is the
total population aged 16e64 in the area; and X corresponds to the
total beneﬁt claimant population in the large geographic entity
(Bell, 1954; White, 1986). The higher the index, the greater the
degree of segregation.
The individual level control variables include ‘the usual sus-
pects’: age and age squared, sex (coded 1 if male, 0 otherwise),
marital status (coded 1 when married or living with partner,
0 otherwise), ﬁve dummies for the highest educational qualiﬁca-
tion attained: degree, other higher degree, A-level, GCSE and other
qualiﬁcations (no qualiﬁcations being the base category), four
dummies for housing tenure (owned outright, owned with mort-
gage, housing association rented and rented from employer and
privately) setting the local authority tenancy as the reference
category and gross total income in the month before interview for10 A more detailed explanation of this estimation technique can be found in
Anderson (2013).
11 Since we only obtained income dispersion estimates for England, we dropped
survey observations from Scotland and Wales.
12 Data on beneﬁt claimants for different geographical units and supplementary
information can be found at http://www.dwp.gov.uk/.
13 This includes some imputed data. Further details can be found in Under-
standing Society, 2012, p. 36.individuals in the household.13We also included dummies for party
supporters, those who had undertaken voluntary activity in past
twelve months and those who were members of a trade union. We
ﬁnally included self-reported interest in politics.
In addition to this battery of individual-level controls, we added
aggregate controls to reduce the potential for an omitted variable
bias. The macro-level variables (derived from the 2001 census) are:
the proportions of the population from an ethnic minority and
working in agriculture; as well as the natural logarithm of the total
population. Finally, we controlled for the afﬂuence of the particular
geographical unit. We created this measure using the median in-
come estimates at LSOA level.14 This value is calculated for each
local authority, constituency and region by taking the average of the
median income for all the LSOAs comprising the larger geograph-
ical units.4. Methods
The basic premise of this paper is that political behaviour is a
product of both individual attributes and social context (Huckfeld
and Sprague, 1995). In principle, this can be assessed using a
regression model that contains both social context and individual-
level characteristics.15 Controlling for the individual's social context
reduces the risk of committing the individualist fallacy: that indi-
vidual behaviour is purely a matter of individual attributes, social,
psychological and political characteristics (Subranian et al., 2009).
Equally, controlling for the individual's characteristics reduces the
risk of committing the ecological fallacy and supposing that indi-
vidual behaviour can be predicted from aggregate data (Robinson,
1950). Our multi-level approach recognizes that behaviour is sha-
ped by both individual and contextual inﬂuences.
When working with grouped data, observations in each group
may have similar characteristics, implying that we may fail to meet
the assumption of independence required for classical regression
methods. We therefore acknowledge the hierarchical nature of the
data and clustered the standard errors at the respective
geographical unit. To further address the issue that observations are
not independently drawn, we ﬁtted multilevel models using
GLLAMM routine, the generalized linear latent and mixed model
estimation procedure provided by STATA 12 (Rabe-Hesketh et al.,
2001).
Since the dependent variable is binary (reported vote ¼ 1, non-
vote ¼ 0) we estimate the models using logistic regression (Aldrich
and Nelson, 1984). In our tables we report the exponentiated logit
coefﬁcients (or odds ratios). When there is a positive relationship
between the independent and dependent variable, the expo-
nentiated coefﬁcients take a value greater than one.When there is a
negative relationship between the independent and dependent
variable, the coefﬁcients are less than one. The substantive effects
of independent variables on the dependent variable are more
difﬁcult to understand than in ordinary least squares because lo-
gistic regression models are inherently non-linear and non-
additive (Liao, 1994). Accordingly, we convey the substantive ef-
fects by producing plots showing how the probability of turning out
to vote varies with levels of segregation or heterogeneity for
‘typical’ individuals (King, 1998).
Previous research has expressed some concern about the
assumption that individuals with a probability of 0.5 of choosing
the two alternatives are most sensitive to changes in the14 These estimates were also generated through the exercise of spatial micro-
simulation.
15 See Achen (1982) on the assumptions that are required to draw causal in-
ferences from cross-sectional data.
Table 1
Exponentiated logistic regression coefﬁcients of the effect of segregation on turnout
at three levels of aggregation (Whole sample).
Voted in last general election LA CONS REG
Individual-level
Ethnic minority 0.989 0.972 0.956
(0.134) (0.136) (0.115)
Age 1.063*** 1.063*** 1.061***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.010)
Age sq. 1.000** 1.000** 1.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male 0.817** 0.817** 0.901þ
(0.054) (0.055) (0.054)
Married 1.508*** 1.470*** 1.595***
(0.110) (0.109) (0.103)
Education
Higher degree 2.355*** 2.491*** 1.805***
(0.296) (0.321) (0.199)
Other degree of higher educ. 1.847*** 1.919*** 1.765***
(0.243) (0.255) (0.209)
A-level 1.567*** 1.628*** 1.534***
(0.178) (0.188) (0.158)
GCSE 1.159 1.158 1.114
(0.122) (0.124) (0.105)
Other qualiﬁcation 0.945 0.975 0.881
(0.139) (0.145) (0.112)
Home tenure
Own outright 1.756*** 1.647*** 1.697***
(0.221) (0.212) (0.190)
Owned with mortgage 1.752*** 1.668*** 1.551***
(0.214) (0.206) (0.167)
Private rented 0.797þ 0.761* 0.898
(0.106) (0.104) (0.105)
Housing association 0.978 0.934 0.928
(0.150) (0.144) (0.124)
Household income 1.000 1.000 1.000þ
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Party support 4.700*** 4.635*** 4.445***
(0.437) (0.434) (0.382)
Interest in politics 2.361*** 2.365*** 2.296***
(0.094) (0.097) (0.083)
Subjective future ﬁnancial situation
Better off 0.871þ 0.840* 0.824**
(0.071) (0.070) (0.061)
Worse than now 1.210* 1.231* 1.153þ
(0.111) (0.116) (0.097)
Subjective current ﬁnancial situation
Living comfortably 1.521* 1.703** 1.593**
(0.277) (0.316) (0.270)
Doing alright 1.348þ 1.506* 1.397*
(0.234) (0.266) (0.226)
Just about getting by 1.397þ 1.530* 1.453*
(0.240) (0.268) (0.233)
Quite difﬁcult 1.338 1.369 1.294
(0.258) (0.268) (0.229)
Macro-level
Share of ethnic minority pop. 1.006 1.005 1.002
(0.009) (0.008) (0.017)
Total population (log) 1.019 0.888þ 1.011
(0.077) (0.058) (0.081)
Share of pop. work. in agri. 0.988 1.006 0.993
(0.041) (0.032) (0.092)
Overall income 0.997 0.998 0.996**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Index of isolation 0.928*** 0.948*** 0.954*
(0.018) (0.015) (0.020)
Constant 0.137 0.133 0.128
(0.151) (0.130) (0.215)
Observations 9963 9963 9963
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with scobit (Nagler, 1991, 1994). The sign and signiﬁcance of the
coefﬁcients are unchanged. This provides some reassurance that
our ﬁndings do not depend on a particular statistical technique.
5. Empirical results
Our empirical models shed light on nature of the relationship
between inequality and electoral participation. Table 1 displays the
estimated exponentiated logit coefﬁcients for variables when we
enter the individual- and aggregate-level controls described above,
together with the measure of segregation (IIS) but without the
other measure of inequality relating to heterogeneity (IQV). Table 2
displays the coefﬁcients estimated when we enter our measure of
heterogeneity (IQV) along with the controls but without the mea-
sure of segregation (IIS). Finally, Table 3 displays the coefﬁcients
when both indicators of inequality are simultaneously entered
along with the control variables.
The coefﬁcients for IIS in Table 1 are all less than 1 and statis-
tically signiﬁcant at p ¼ 0.05 or less. This suggests that segregation
signiﬁcantly depresses turnout at the local authority, constituency
and regional levels, controlling for all other variables. Collectively,
these ﬁndings provide support for H1: the greater the segregation,
the lower the probability that any given individual will turn out and
vote on election-day.
For all the three models in Table 1, we computed the predicted
probabilities of voting in order to facilitate the interpretation of the
results. The marginal effects represent the impact of a one unit
change in our independent variables on the probability of turnout
for a ‘typical’ individual with average (mean or modal)
characteristics.
Figs. 1e3 plot the predicted probabilities of voter turnout for the
full range of the IIS for each of the geographical units under
consideration. The negative effect is clear from the downward
slopes. These indicate that as economic isolation increases, the
probability of voting goes down. In substantive terms, controlling
for the effect of all other explanatory variables in the regression, a
ten unit increase in the IIS index is associated with declines of 10
percentage points in the case of local authorities, 16 points in the
case of constituencies and 5 points in the case of regions.
All the coefﬁcients for heterogeneity (IQV) displayed in Table 2
are greater than one and all but one are statistically signiﬁcant at
the p < 0.05 threshold. The coefﬁcient for the constituency level is
also signiﬁcant at the more statistically generous threshold of
p < 0.10. These ﬁndings collectively provide support for H2: eco-
nomic heterogeneity within areas increases the probability that any
given individual will turn out and vote.
Again, the predicted marginal probabilities for a ‘typical’ indi-
vidual help us to understand the relationship between the
dependent and independent variables. The ﬂatter slopes in
Figs. 4e7 suggest that the impact of heterogeneity is not as sharp as
segregation. Nevertheless, economic diversity within geographical
units generates moderately positive effects on the probability that
the ‘typical’ individual will turn out and vote of between 6 and 7 per
cent for a one unit increase in IQV.
These ﬁndings conﬁrm our hypothesis that segregation and
heterogeneity exert different effects and offset each other to someGroups 304 436 16
Log Likelihood 3570 3561 3794
þ 0.10 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001.
16 The two measures of inequality are strongly e but not perfectly e correlated.
The Pearson's R between IIS and IQV at the constituency and local authority levels
is 0.79, while the correlation at the regional level is 0.82. This collinearity in-
creases the size of the standard errors and may raise concerns as to whether it is
possible to identify the unique impact of the two measures of inequality. Never-
theless, the two IIS coefﬁcients for local authorities and constituencies in Table 3 are
statistically signiﬁcant and consistent with theory.extent.16 Not surprisingly, therefore, models in Table 3, which
contain variables representing both segregation and heterogeneity,
Table 2
Exponentiated logistic regression coefﬁcients of the effect of heterogeneity on
turnout at four levels of aggregation (Whole sample).
Voted in last general election WARD LA CONS REGION
Individual-level
Ethnic minority 0.868 0.977 0.958 0.961
(0.137) (0.132) (0.134) (0.116)
Age 1.059*** 1.063*** 1.062*** 1.062***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010)
Age sq. 1.000* 1.000** 1.000** 1.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male 0.751*** 0.810** 0.814** 0.902þ
(0.055) (0.054) (0.055) (0.054)
Married 1.506*** 1.518*** 1.468*** 1.598***
(0.126) (0.110) (0.109) (0.103)
Education
Higher degree 2.544*** 2.367*** 2.542*** 1.797***
(0.362) (0.296) (0.328) (0.198)
Other degree of higher educ. 1.831*** 1.866*** 1.956*** 1.762***
(0.269) (0.245) (0.259) (0.209)
A-level 1.654*** 1.570*** 1.654*** 1.534***
(0.211) (0.178) (0.190) (0.158)
GCSE 1.162 1.165 1.174 1.113
(0.139) (0.123) (0.126) (0.105)
Other qualiﬁcation 0.945 0.958 0.979 0.875
(0.159) (0.142) (0.146) (0.111)
Home tenure
Own outright 1.906*** 1.758*** 1.674*** 1.710***
(0.280) (0.223) (0.215) (0.192)
Owned with mortgage 1.888*** 1.743*** 1.691*** 1.563***
(0.268) (0.213) (0.208) (0.168)
Private rented 0.739þ 0.804 0.781þ 0.907
(0.115) (0.108) (0.106) (0.106)
Housing association 0.925 0.991 0.937 0.927
(0.164) (0.153) (0.145) (0.124)
Household income 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000þ
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Party support 5.352*** 4.660*** 4.616*** 4.436***
(0.549) (0.434) (0.432) (0.381)
Interest in politics 2.590*** 2.365*** 2.367*** 2.295***
(0.119) (0.094) (0.097) (0.083)
Subjective future ﬁnancial situation
Better off 0.829* 0.872þ 0.842* 0.822**
(0.077) (0.071) (0.070) (0.061)
Worse than now 1.175 1.195þ 1.222* 1.155þ
(0.122) (0.110) (0.116) (0.097)
Subjective current ﬁnancial situation
Living comfortably 1.592* 1.527* 1.720** 1.588**
(0.326) (0.277) (0.318) (0.269)
Doing alright 1.458þ 1.351þ 1.520* 1.395*
(0.285) (0.234) (0.268) (0.226)
Just about getting by 1.442þ 1.399* 1.543* 1.440*
(0.279) (0.239) (0.269) (0.231)
Quite difﬁcult 1.360 1.343 1.388þ 1.292
(0.294) (0.257) (0.271) (0.229)
Macro-level
Share of ethnic minority pop. 1.007 0.998 1.003 1.015
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.015)
Total population (log) 0.995 1.014 0.880þ 0.959
(0.078) (0.065) (0.060) (0.089)
Share of pop. work. in agri. 0.997 1.002 1.005 1.074
(0.011) (0.039) (0.029) (0.095)
Overall income 1.000 0.999 0.999 0.994***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Index of qualitative variation 1.034* 1.051* 1.041þ 1.071**
(0.017) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025)
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000)
Observations 9963 9963 9963 9963
Groups 1510 304 436 16
Log Likelihood 3432 3572 3564 3793
þ 0.10 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001.
Table 3
Exponentiated logistic regression coefﬁcients of the effect of both segregation and
heterogeneity at three levels of aggregation (Whole sample).
Voted in last general election LA CONS REGION
Individual-level
Ethnic minority 0.988 0.970 0.961
(0.134) (0.136) (0.116)
Age 1.063*** 1.063*** 1.062***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.010)
Age sq. 1.000** 1.000** 1.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male 0.817** 0.817** 0.902þ
(0.054) (0.055) (0.054)
Married 1.509*** 1.469*** 1.600***
(0.110) (0.109) (0.104)
Education
Higher degree 2.355*** 2.491*** 1.801***
(0.296) (0.321) (0.198)
Other degree of higher educ. 1.848*** 1.921*** 1.766***
(0.243) (0.255) (0.209)
A-level 1.567*** 1.628*** 1.532***
(0.178) (0.188) (0.158)
GCSE 1.159 1.158 1.113
(0.122) (0.124) (0.105)
Other qualiﬁcation 0.945 0.973 0.876
(0.139) (0.145) (0.112)
Home tenure
Own outright 1.756*** 1.647*** 1.708***
(0.221) (0.212) (0.191)
Owned with mortgage 1.752*** 1.670*** 1.564***
(0.214) (0.206) (0.168)
Private rented 0.798þ 0.762* 0.905
(0.106) (0.104) (0.106)
Housing association 0.978 0.935 0.930
(0.150) (0.144) (0.125)
Household income 1.000 1.000 1.000þ
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Party support 4.697*** 4.633*** 4.446***
(0.437) (0.434) (0.383)
Interest in politics 2.361*** 2.366*** 2.295***
(0.095) (0.097) (0.083)
Subjective future ﬁnancial situation
Better off 0.871þ 0.840* 0.823**
(0.071) (0.070) (0.061)
Worse than now 1.209* 1.230* 1.153þ
(0.111) (0.116) (0.097)
Subjective current ﬁnancial situation
Living comfortably 1.522* 1.707** 1.585**
(0.278) (0.317) (0.269)
Doing alright 1.349þ 1.508* 1.391*
(0.235) (0.267) (0.225)
Just about getting by 1.397þ 1.532* 1.440*
(0.240) (0.268) (0.231)
Quite difﬁcult 1.338 1.370 1.291
(0.258) (0.268) (0.229)
Macro-level
Share of ethnic minority pop. 1.006 1.004 1.020
(0.009) (0.008) (0.018)
Total population (log) 1.019 0.888þ 0.964
(0.078) (0.058) (0.089)
Share of pop. work. in agri. 0.989 1.006 1.079
(0.043) (0.032) (0.100)
Overall income 0.997 0.997 0.994***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Index of qualitative variation 1.005 1.011 1.046
(0.030) (0.026) (0.036)
Index of isolation 0.930** 0.951** 0.973
(0.022) (0.018) (0.031)
Constant 0.0867 0.0506 0.00119*
(0.262) (0.124) (0.004)
Observations 9963 9963 9963
Groups 304 436 16
Log Likelihood 3570 3561 3793
þ 0.10 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001.
J. Bartle et al. / Electoral Studies 48 (2017) 30e44 35produce somewhat weaker results. The only signiﬁcant effects are
negative relationships between IIS and turnout at the localauthority and parliamentary constituency levels. The IQV measures
of heterogeneity are no longer signiﬁcant in any three of themodels
Fig. 1. Predicted probability of turnout (with 95% conﬁdence limits) by segregation for local authority level (All respondents).
Fig. 2. Predicted probability of turnout (with 95% conﬁdence limits) by segregation for constituency level (All respondents).
J. Bartle et al. / Electoral Studies 48 (2017) 30e4436of Table 3. Thus, in the ‘tournament’ between two indicators of
inequality, segregation apparently trumps heterogeneity as a pre-
dictor of individual turnout. The net effect of these two inequalities,
however, is to reduce electoral participation.
These ﬁndings naturally cause one to suspect that some sort of
interaction effects might be present that suppress the effect of
variables (Friedrich, 1982). Further analyses, however, suggest that
there are no signiﬁcant interactions between the two indicators of
inequality.17
A comparison of the coefﬁcients for inequality at the different17 This is, of course, a consequence of the high correlation between IIS and QV (see
fn.17).levels of aggregation provides limited support for H3: the propo-
sition that inequality has greater effects at smaller levels of ag-
gregation. As we depicted in the plots of predicted probabilities of
the index of isolation, the impact of segregation at the electoral
constituency level is actually smaller than the local authority level
(which is typically a larger geographic area). In partial conformity
with our expectations, the impact of segregation is least pro-
nounced at the regional level. The models in Table 2 suggest that
the impact of heterogeneity neither increases nor decreases at the
higher levels of aggregation. The models in Table 3 provide the
strongest evidence in support of H3. While heterogeneity exerts no
signiﬁcant effect, the impact of segregation is evident at the
smallest geographical units of the constituency and local authority,
but the same variable is not signiﬁcant at the regional level.
Fig. 3. Predicted probability of turnout (with 95% conﬁdence limits) by segregation for regional level (All respondents).
Fig. 4. Predicted probability of turnout (with 95% conﬁdence limits) by heterogeneity for ward-level (All respondents).
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J. Bartle et al. / Electoral Studies 48 (2017) 30e44 37H4 suggests that the impact of inequality is greater on those
individuals at the lower end of the socio-economic ladder. In order
to assess this, we divided the sample by income, generating two
subsets e one of individuals above the median income in the
sample and one of those below the median income. We then re-
estimated the models in Tables 1e3 for the income sub-groups.
These additional analyses allow us to examine the effects of het-
erogeneity and economic isolation on turnout in different portions
of the electorate.
In these analyses we applied exactly the same controls as in
Tables 1e3 The coefﬁcients for the indicators of inequality are
displayed in Table 4. On this occasion, however, we do not report
the full regression results in order to facilitate direct visualcomparison between the above and below median income
groups.18
The coefﬁcients reported in Table 4 suggest that the effects of
the inequality are stronger for those individuals with below-
average incomes. The exponentiated logistic regression co-
efﬁcients for the IIS variables in the model that contains controls
(but not IQV) are all statistically signiﬁcant and less than 1. This
again suggests that the probability of turnout declines with
increased segregation for this group. By contrast, only one of the IIS
coefﬁcients (for the regional level) are statistically signiﬁcant forFull details on request.
Fig. 5. Predicted probability of turnout (with 95% conﬁdence limits) by heterogeneity for local authority level (All respondents).
Fig. 6. Predicted probability of turnout (with 95% conﬁdence limits) by heterogeneity for constituency level (All respondents).
J. Bartle et al. / Electoral Studies 48 (2017) 30e4438the above median income group. Similarly, the coefﬁcients for the
models containing IQV (but not IIS) are signiﬁcant and greater than
1 for those with below median levels of income at all four levels of
geographical aggregation. This again suggests that turnout de-
creases with increased heterogeneity. By contrast, IQV has a sta-
tistically signiﬁcant effect on turnout in the above-median-income
sample only in one of the four levels of geographical aggregation
(the regional level).
To make these ﬁndings more comprehensible, we again plot the
probability a typical citizen would turn out and vote. In relation to
the effect of economic segregation among those in the group of
below-average income respondents, the set of probabilities plotted
in Figs. 8e10 show clear descending line in all the geographicalunits. As we move from the minimum scores of economic segre-
gation to the maximum scores there is a corresponding decrease of
30 percentage points at constituency level, 26 points at local au-
thority level and 11 points at the regional level. Similarly, hetero-
geneity plays a signiﬁcant role in lessening the probability of vote
among the lower income respondents as the IQV scores increase it
by 15 percentage points at ward level, 19 points at constituency
level, 13 points at local authority level and 11 points at regional
level (see Fig. 11,12,13,14).
We have already discussed the possibility of a stronger inﬂuence
of our key contextual variables measured at the lowest geograph-
ical levels on the individuals’ decision to vote (H4). We have sug-
gested that potential voters may be more motivated to vote when
Fig. 7. Predicted probability of turnout (with 95% conﬁdence limits) by heterogeneity for regional level (All respondents).
Table 4
Exponentiated logistic regression coefﬁcients for segregation and heterogeneity for
those above and below median income.
Voted in general election Ward Local Constituency Region
Authority
Segregation
Above median 1.009 1.004 0.917*
Below median 0.931*** 0.926*** 0.939**
Heterogeneity
Above median 1.022 0.983 1.003 1.107*
Below median 1.041* 1.058þ 1.061* 1.076*
Both
Segregation
Above median 1.002 1.008 0.944
Below median 0.937** 0.931** 1.017
Heterogeneity
Above median 0.985 1.009 1.049
Below median 1.018 1.013 1.090
Note. The same battery of controls ae applied as in Tables 1e3.
Fig. 8. Predicted probability of turnout (with 95% conﬁdence limits) by seg
J. Bartle et al. / Electoral Studies 48 (2017) 30e44 39they perceive that the immediate environment is more economi-
cally divided. Regarding the impact of economic segregation, data
seem to indicate that potential voters from the lower income group
withdraw from participating in the election when they experience
spatial isolation. In other words, the impact of the geo-economic
isolation is considerably stronger when measured at local and
constituency levels than when it is calculated at regional level. In
contrast, our non-spatial measure of economic inequality, the IQV,
does not provide deﬁnitive evidence to support H4.
As stated above, the degree of economic segregation and het-
erogeneity at the lowest levels of geographical aggregation have no
statistically signiﬁcant effects on the decision to vote among those
in the above-average income group (Table 4). However, we observe
that regional economic segregation and heterogeneity exert a sta-
tistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence on voter turnout. To further illustrate
these results, Figs. 15 and 16 present predicted probabilities of
voting as generated by the models.regation at local authority level (Below median income respondents).
Fig. 9. Predicted probability of turnout (with 95% conﬁdence limits) by segregation at constituency level (Below median income respondents).
Fig. 10. Predicted probability of turnout (with 95% conﬁdence limits) by segregation at regional level (Below median income respondents).
J. Bartle et al. / Electoral Studies 48 (2017) 30e4440Simulating a change from lowest to highest segregation scores
decreases the probability of voting from about 0.94 to about 0.84, or
by about 10 probability points. A change from lowest to highest
regional economic heterogeneity increases the same probability
from about 0.70 to about 0.85, that is, by about 15 points. Never-
theless, it is worth noting that when both measures of inequality
are included in the same regression the coefﬁcients lose statistical
signiﬁcance (see Table 4).
The net result of our analysis is that though economic segre-
gation between areas and heterogeneity within areas both affect
electoral participation, they do so in distinct ways, and that when
these two effects are taken into consideration jointly, thedepressive effect of segregation trumps the positive effect of het-
erogeneity, especially among less afﬂuent individuals. In other
words, social isolation of economically marginalized groups e
‘ghettoization’ e generates the most signiﬁcant impact on rates of
electoral participation, and this impact is a negative one.
6. Discussion and conclusion
This paper has gone some way toward expanding our under-
standing of the causal mechanisms through which economic dif-
ferentiation affects electoral participation. We have found evidence
to support both a ‘mobilizing’ and a ‘demobilizing’ effect of
Fig. 11. Predicted probability of turnout (with 95% conﬁdence limits) by heterogeneity at ward level (Below median income respondents).
Fig. 12. Predicted probability of turnout (with 95% conﬁdence limits) by heterogeneity at local authority level (Below median income respondents).
J. Bartle et al. / Electoral Studies 48 (2017) 30e44 41inequality on electoral participation. Economic heterogeneity
within areas is associated with greater propensity to participate in
elections, while segregation between areas appears to depress the
likelihood that an individual will go to the polls, all else being equal.
Moreover, when the two effects are considered together at a given
level of aggregation, our ﬁndings suggest that segregation between
areas outweighs heterogeneity within areas, such that the overall
impact of inequality is negative.
These ﬁndings have implications for our understanding of both
participation and inequality. They conﬁrm the relevance of
contextual effects on voting behaviour, but they suggest that
context may affect people's propensity to vote in a variety ofdifferent ways simultaneously. Speciﬁcally, it seems that social
interaction among the poor appears to reinforce norms of non-
participation. By contrast, interaction between people from
different social groups seems to have a mobilizing effect. Thus
inequality is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon with
distinct spatial aspects to it. This observation indicates the need for
scholars of inequality to specify clearly e both conceptually and
operationally e the type of inequality they expect to impact on the
phenomena they analyse, in as much as different forms of
inequality can, as this analysis has demonstrated, have diametri-
cally opposed effects.
Future research could usefully explore in greater depth the
Fig. 13. Predicted probability of turnout (with 95% conﬁdence limits) by heterogeneity at constituency level (Below median income respondents).
Fig. 14. Predicted probability of turnout (with 95% conﬁdence limits) by heterogeneity at regional level (Below median income respondents).
J. Bartle et al. / Electoral Studies 48 (2017) 30e4442micro-causal mechanisms behind the ﬁndings presented here. We
may speculate that when individuals live with others who are
relatively similar in socio-economic terms, they will have limited
experience of inequality in the places that they traverse in their
daily routines. They are likely to have little face-to-face contact
with people far from them in the socio-economic spectrum rather
they will tend to respond to subtle cues in their immediate
neighbourhoods and social networks as to the desirability of elec-
toral participation (Cho and Rudolph, 2008; Abrams et al., 2011). If
they are aware of inequality it will be through themedia or through
a general sense within their community that their area is disad-
vantaged in comparison to other areas. Their experience of
inequality will therefore be indirect rather than direct. This lower
level of immediacy in the way inequality is experienced inrelatively homogeneous neighbourhoods may account for the role
of segmentation is shaping participation.
We recognise that this emphasis on social interaction e while
plausible and consistent with the data e is speculative and that
other mechanisms may be in play. Future research should also
examine the relationship between inequalities and the mobiliza-
tion efforts of political parties and other institutions. Parties have
incentives to exploit the opportunities associatedwith inequality in
both e or indeed all e its forms (Denver and Hands, 1997). Differ-
ential turnout by party supporters can tip an election one way or
another. Inequality should therefore predict variations in the in-
tensity of party campaigns. It should be possible to establish if
inequality exerts any net effect controlling for this variable. These
ﬁndings would go some way to understanding the causal
Fig. 15. Predicted probability of turnout (with 95% conﬁdence limits) by segregation at regional level (Above median income respondents).
Fig. 16. Predicted probability of turnout (with 95% conﬁdence limits) by heterogeneity at regional level (Above median income respondents).
J. Bartle et al. / Electoral Studies 48 (2017) 30e44 43mechanisms by which inequality inﬂuences participation both
across space and through time.References
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